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The crises and mutations of contemporary capitalism have rendered palpable Marx's 
observation according to which in bourgeois modernity human beings are 'ruled by 
abstractions'.i The processes of financialisation animating the dynamics of the 2007-8 
crisis involved the violent irruption into the everyday lives of millions, a panoply of 
ominous acronyms (ABSs, CDOs, SIVs, HFT, and so on), indices of highly-mathematised 
strategies of profit-extraction whose mechanics were often opaque to their own 
beneficiaries. At the same time, this process of financialisation was articulated to the most 
seemingly 'concrete', 'tangible' and thus desirable use and exchange value available to the 
citizens of so-called advanced liberal democracies: the home. This is a site, a social 
relation, that as Ferreira da Silva and Chakravartty have noted encompasses the ‘juridical, 
political and economic’,  thus serving as a lived material synthesis of the three main axes of 
modern thought.ii  
 In the United States it was quickly revealed – indeed, it had been pointed out before 
the crisis by some critical geographersiii – that the devastating socialisation of the costs of  
accumulation via the housing market took deeply racialised (and gendered) forms, 
grafting, through a host of complex mediations, the forbiddingly impersonal realities of 
derivative contracts onto the deep and ongoing racial history of property markets and 
urban geographies. In this article, we want to think through this articulation of race, 
property and capitalist abstraction, exploring how attention to the forms of property may 
permit novel and politically urgent insights into the relationship between capitalism and 
race, addressing a critical area of social contestation in which processes of racialisation are 
intensely present, but in which they are also frequently 'disappeared'.iv  We revisit the place 
of property in Marxist theories of abstraction, to consider whether it can provide us with 
some of the instruments to think the present conjuncture, but also to explore the ways in 
which a consideration of the racial logics of property may require us to recalibrate our 
understanding of the violence of abstraction. 
 
Separation, dissolution, abstraction  
If we take Marx to have been engaged in the practical, emancipatory critique of capitalism, 
not just as a class system of exploitation but as a social form of abstract domination, then 
we can understand that under the misleadingly simple slogan 'the abolition of private 
property' lies the formidable problem of transcending a social relation, 'bourgeois 
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property', which serves as the crucial nexus between the state (the object of Marx's earliest 
critique) and the economy. In what sense is the question of private property a question of 
abstraction? Above all, perhaps, in the sense that private property (understood not as 
personal possession but as the legally-sanctioned power to dispose of the means of 
production, and thus to dispose of labour-power: property as synonymous with capital) 
depends on a social process of separation – abstraction in the etymological sense of 
pulling out, extracting. In one of Marx's most important mature treatments of the question 
of property, the section on pre-capitalist formations in the notebooks later collected as the 
Grundrisse, this separation is discussed in terms of a dissolution.  
 In passages that foreshadow his treatment of so-called primitive accumulation in 
the first volume of Capital, Marx depicts capitalism as the first system in which political or 
communal relations are no longer presupposed by property but are 'posed' by it. Far from 
being conditioned by a pre-existing community, property qua capital becomes the only real 
community, the one dominated by abstraction, by money. As he writes, ‘the relation of 
labour to capital ... presupposes a process of history which dissolves the various forms in 
which the worker is a proprietor, or in which the proprietor works’.v He is alluding to the 
dissolution of the relation to the earth, in which there is ‘direct common property’vi; the 
dissolution of proprietorship of the instrument (in craft production); the dissolution of the 
means of subsistence; and the dissolution of serfdom and slavery. These are the ‘historic 
presuppositions’ ‘needed before the worker can be found as a free worker, as objectless, 
purely subjective labour capacity confronting the objective conditions of production as his 
not-property, as alien property, as value for-itself, as capital’.vii This process, which Marx 
strikingly terms that of 'dissolution into capital', is one in which: ‘The objective conditions 
of labour now confront these unbound, propertyless individuals only in the form of values, 
self-sufficient values’.viii 'Private property' is thus understood as a double movement of 
abstraction, one which is conditioned by historical processes of separation  but which in its 
real subsumption of social life continues to serve as a potent agent of dissolution.  
 This theme of dissolution was already present in Marx's thinking about the political 
and economic functions of landed property back in the Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts, where he wrote: 'It is necessary that this appearance be abolished - that 
landed property, the root of private property, be dragged completely into the movement of 
private property and that it become a commodity; that the rule of the proprietor appear as 
the undisguised rule of private property, of capital, freed of all political tincture'.ix For the 
purposes of our argument, we should be sensitive to the different accents given in Marx's 
early and later work to this theme of property as the dissolution (which is to say the 
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abstraction) of social bonds. Roughly, property is presented in the early Marx's work as an 
agent of abstraction whose real subsumption of social life (and destruction of concrete 
community) serves as a kind of tragic but necessary prelude to emancipation, to the 
emergence of a universality antagonistic to that of capital. In the Grundrisse we can 
instead discern a way of thinking both the rupture represented by the emergence of 
capitalist property and the persistence (albeit over-determined by capitalist forms) of so-
called pre-capitalist relations. This is what the Hegelian formulation – property now 
posing its own presuppositions – entails. (It is also, as we shall discuss below, what Stuart 
Hall was trying to capture in his deployment of the Althusserian notion of articulation.) 
 In his Intellectual and Manual Labour, elaborating on Marx's insights into the 
commodity form, the German philosopher Alfred Sohn-Rethel argued that the origins of 
the abstract concepts of ancient philosophy were to be located what he called 'the 
exchange-abstraction', the activity of generalised commodity-exchange and monetisation 
that served as the unconscious practical 'social synthesis' of Ancient Greek society. It was 
the existence of a really abstract social practice which stood as the presupposition of 
mental or intellectual abstraction. It was because the ancient Greeks acted abstractly, so to 
speak, that they could think abstractly. Marx's uniqueness for Sohn-Rethel lay in being 
able to provide the means for fully historical, practical explanations of the emergence of 
seemingly ahistorical forms. Applying Marx's understanding of the commodity to the study 
of the social unconscious of philosophy allowed one to see how the practice of exchange 
served as the concrete spatio-temporal basis for a thinking that could powerfully abstract 
from both space and time. As Sohn-Rethel writes: 
 
Abstraction is therefore the effect of the action of men, and not of their thought. 
In reality, it takes place ‘behind their backs’, at the blind spot, so to speak, of 
human consciousness, that is there where the thinking and efforts of men are 
absorbed by their acts of exchange.x 
 
 Now, in what sense can we treat property (more accurately: the legal forms of 
private property) as a 'real abstraction'? However we may frame or interpret it, there is a 
prima facie force to the notion that the imposition and generalisation of private property 
did (and continue to) play a formidable role in dissolving social and communal relations, 
or at the very least in 'positing' them as internal to a property logic. Private property's role 
as an agent of separation from means of production and subsistence is also not in doubt, 
and lies at the centre of a vibrant contemporary debate on the 'commons' and 'common 
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goods'.xi Yet a key feature of the account of real abstraction in Sohn-Rethel, arguably 
present in certain formulations of Marx also, is troubled by greater attention to the legal 
forms of property. That feature is the unconscious character ascribed to commodity-
exchange as a form of practical abstraction. Any account of the pre-capitalist 
presuppositions of capitalist abstract domination cannot rest content, as Sohn-Rethel 
seems to, with investigating the exchange-abstraction in ancient forms of commodity-
based socialisation. It also requires thinking of the specificity of legal abstractions as 
deliberate devices of social organisation which were in turn necessary but not sufficient 
presuppositions for the emergence of capitalism.  
 The legal historian Yan Thomas, writing on Roman law, suggests we should think of 
abstraction as constitutive of the operations of the law. This is true of the ‘formal dispositif 
that isolates in each of us, abstracting from what is irreducibly singular in us, a juridical 
personality, in which almost nothing appears of our physical, psychic and social reality, 
because it is reduced to a single function: our capacity to hold and exercise rights’.xii Here 
we can see how modern law is conceived in terms of a twofold process ‘of incarnation and 
naturalization, on the one hand, and of separation and abstraction, on the other, of the 
juridical person’.xiii It is also at work, importantly, in what Thomas presents as the 
‘juridical constitution of things in general’,xiv where the res stands both for appropriable 
things of property and commerce, on the one hand, and sacred or public inappropriable 
things, res nullius in bonis, on the other.xv Thomas presents his ‘proceduralist’ approach as 
one that can reveal how Roman law ‘already had a formalist and abstract idea of the 
economy’ (by contrast with what has been argued by the historical anthropology of the 
ancient world); for him, ‘the history of law partakes of a history of the techniques and 
instruments through which the putting into abstract form of our societies has taken place’. 
If that is not properly grasped, he warns, ‘the singularity of that history and the specificity 
of its object’ will be totally missed. Thomas shows how the reduction of a thing (res) to its 
price (pretium) – the identity of being and value, in other words – was itself a product of 
juridical procedure, or legal judgment, in which the res was ‘abstracted and reduced to its 
value’,xvi permitting a ‘representation of a purely countable substance of goods’,xvii in its 
turn made possible by the circumscription of a sacred or public sphere of unappropriable 
goods. In Michele Spanò’s gloss, ‘law – the most efficacious speech – has a power of 
transformation without equals: it is a machine for abstraction which, through the medium 
of language, translates the real and produces it otherwise’.xviii  
 In light of the Marxist debate surveyed here, the question arises: what is the relation 
between the social practices of abstraction (grounded in abstract labour and the 
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commodity form) that Marx and Marxists have posited as somehow ‘beneath’ or ‘before’ 
the juridical, though articulated with it, and even requiring it as an ‘indispensable 
moment’, and what Thomas calls ‘the political construction of the commodity’xix by law, 
which would appear to present the operation of abstraction as a deliberate juridical 
procedure, conditioning economic valorisation and accumulation, rather than the other 
way around? Answering such questions might also require at least posing the problem of 
the extent to which private property as a moment of capital and private property in 
property law are superimposable without remainder.  
 
Property between law and capital  
In 1865 Marx wrote this about Proudhon:  
 
Thus history itself had expressed its criticism upon past property 
relations.What Proudhon was actually dealing with was modern bourgeois 
property as it exists today. The question of what this is could have only been 
answered by a critical analysis of 'political economy', embracing the totality of 
these property relations, considering not their legal aspect as relations of 
volition but their real form, that is, as relations of production. xx 
 
 In this passage is encapsulated what would become, especially in the 1960s and 
1970s, a vexed question within Marxist debates about law, debates which were in many 
ways motivated by the now largely forgotten debates about the forms of property and the 
transition to socialism, but which were perhaps most memorably encapsulated in E.P. 
Thompson's much-quoted acerbic retort to Althusser that in the history of English 
capitalism law was to be found 'at every bloody level'. Without trying to summarise these 
debates we can note that Marx himself stayed true to his observation, made as early as 
1847 in 'Moralising Criticism and Critical Morality' that 'private property is not an abstract 
concept or a simple relation but the totality of bourgeois relations of production'xxi and 
thus that treating private property as synonymous with its purely legal form or that form's 
conceptual and ahistorical hypostasis was insufficient.  
 Whence the various attempts to distinguish, in ways which at times seem to re-
propose the old distinction between (real) possession and (legal) property, between 
property as legally-inscribed and property as a social relation that may exceed its legal 
form.xxii Thus Nicos Poulantzas would write of how he and Charles Bettelheim had 'noted 
that it is necessary to distinguish, in the term 'property' used by Marx, formal legal 
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property, which may not belong to the 'individual' capitalist, and economic property or real 
appropriation, which is the only genuine economic power.’xxiii In Reading Capital, Étienne 
Balibar  notes that for Marx juridical forms are supremely ambivalent, as they 'express' and 
'codify' at the same time as they mask economic reality. More importantly for our 
purposes, though he recognises the need to keep the space between law, politics and 
economy open, he also observes how in the specific case of property this is rendered 
terminologically and conceptually arduous: 
 
Hence a difficult terminological problem as well, since the concepts in which the 
relations of production are expressed are precisely concepts in which the 
economic and the legal are indistinct, starting with the concept of property. 
What is ‘property’ insofar as it forms a system within the relatively autonomous 
structure of production, and logically precedes the law of property peculiar to 
the society considered? Such is the problem which must be initiated for 
capitalism too.xxiv 
 
Every element in the mode of production under capitalism is said by Balibar then to 
receive a 'juridical qualification'; it is inscribed in a legal system marked by its abstract 
universality, a universality which is a reflection of the commodity system – such that the 
commodity would serve as the cell-form for social abstraction under capitalism.xxv 
Criticising Bettelheim's notion of 'economic property' in a later text, Balibar would go 
further and note that the risk in such a notion (aside from introducing the law of property 
into a concept whose purpose was to keep it at a distance) was that while rightly not 
wishing to confuse relations of production and juridical forms of property, it neglected the 
practical historical role of juridical forms of property, the fact that juridical form was an 
indispensable moment in capital accumulation; that the accumulation and concentration 
of capital 'cannot take place without a systematic use of the resources of property law'.xxvi   
 This bears some relation to the critique rendered by Paul Hirst of the place of 
property in the Marxist legal theories of Evgeny Pashukanis and Karl Renner. Hirst 
criticises Marxist theories of the law that reduce legal subjectivity down to the archetypical 
capitalist, the subject of property right, who engages in economic calculation.xxvii The joint-
stock company and the shareholder, Hirst argued, represents a type of ownership that is 
not confined by the 'triple coincidence of property, possession and calculation [in 
exchange]' that lies at the heart of Marxist considerations of property law. Moreover, the 
problem of what ‘capital’ is cannot be separated from questions of the legal definition of its 
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form of organisation. As the emergence of the joint-stock company illustrates, 'there is no 
given form of this organisation'.xxviii In other words, inventiveness, and a certain amount of 
flexibility in legal forms,  enabling the emergence of new configurations of ownership and 
market relations, may be as central to our understanding of property as a juridical, 
economic and social relation as are laws which are taken to directly express the commodity 
form in its fundamental coordinates. 
 
Articulating race and property   
In light of the aforementioned discussions, we can say that to understand the abstractive 
powers of property law – and their articulation with and use of racial difference in 
processes of propertisation and profit – we cannot simply treat property forms as 
reflections or adjuncts of commodity forms, which is also to say that we cannot treat the 
question of the practical reality of abstraction as one which is simply adjudicated at the 
(very abstract) level of the formal analysis of capital. What we would seem to require is a 
way of thinking the articulation between distinct and sometimes independent modalities 
of abstraction. We would need to be able to think the articulation between events and 
processes of abstraction/dissolution (the moments of primitive accumulation or 
accumulation by dispossession); the 'unconscious' abstracting social practices (as grasped, 
for instance, in Sohn-Rethel's account of the exchange-abstraction); the high-level logic of 
abstraction intrinsic to value as a social form of capitalism; and the relatively autonomous 
and deliberate practices and devices of abstraction (scientific, mathematical, linguistic, but 
also political and juridical) that are either articulated with real abstraction or posed by it as 
its 'presuppositions'. The problem of the creation and use of racial difference within 
practices of accumulation and dispossession, and its link to financialised abstraction and 
property law, in the case under consideration, would thus require not a reduction or 
integration, but an articulation of different modalities of abstraction, including race itself 
as an abstraction. 'Racism', writes Ruth Wilson Gilmore, 'is a practice of abstraction, a 
death-dealing displacement of difference into hierarchies that organize relations within 
and between the planet’s sovereign political territories'. Processes of abstraction, Gilmore 
notes, figure humans in relation to inhuman persons in a hierarchy that produces the 
totalising category of the 'human being'. xxix  
 We take this notion of articulation from the work of Stuart Hall in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, in particular from his theoretical and political interventions into 
contemporary debates about Marxist method, interventions which centred on the question 
of race. Besides testaments to Hall's capacious scope and the generous engagement with a 
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welter of different positions, these texts are unique in taking the different formations of 
race within capitalism as the impetus to rethink Marx's method of abstraction, and vice 
versa. In this regard, they can be said not only to address the varieties of racialised 
capitalism – in a way which can hopefully elucidate the place of property within them – 
they also offer vital perspectives through which to revisit those problems of abstraction and 
concreteness most memorably outlined in Marx's '1857 Introduction', a text to which Hall 
returned to time and again.xxx 
 Though it is not possible to do much justice to Hall's insights here, we can note that 
his return to Marx's dialectic of the abstract and the concrete via Althusser's theory of over-
determination was aimed at generating a Marxist theory capable of truly thinking 
difference. Against an ultra-Hegelian reading of Marx that would view his mature work 
through the lens of the self-movement of capital's categories, Hall stressed that Marx's 
were concepts 'which differentiate in the very moment that they reveal hidden 
connections'xxxi; though capitalism 'tends to reproduce itself in expanded form as if it were 
a self-equilibrating and self-sustaining system',xxxii it constantly relies on precarious social 
and political mediations, including racisms themselves, none of which are guaranteed by 
an ineluctable logic. Though Hall, unlike many of his peers, does not jettison the notion of 
totality, he repeatedly asserts that capitalist social formations are complexly structured 
differentiated totalities, unities that require differentiation, in which, to use Neil Smith's 
formulation, the production of sameness or equivalence is always accompanied by a 
production of difference. From the Althusser of For Marx (which Hall plays off against 
what he perceived as the overly rigid structuralism of Reading Capital), he draws 'the 
recognition that there are different social contradictions with different origins; that the 
contradictions which drive the historical process forward do not always appear in the same 
place, and will not always have the same historical effects'.xxxiii Hall's counter-intuitive 
avowal that Althusser 'enabled me to live in and with difference'xxxiv is brought home by his 
autobiographical analysis of the contrasting over-determinations of class by race in the UK 
and Jamaica, and of the ways in which these different structurations-in-dominance – one 
in which the immigrant 'black' was starkly opposed to the native 'white', the other in which 
'black' sat at one end of a spectrum in which 'white' was the absent apex – shaped everyday 
life and discourse.xxxv Hall's insistence that in certain societies race can be the way 'the 
modality in which class is “lived”, the medium through which class relations are 
experienced, the form in which it is appropriated and “fought through”'xxxvi is here 
compounded by the account, bolstered by a Marxism of difference, of how the abstract 
categories or systems of representations attached to race are experienced. The abstractions 
 9 
of race are in this regard not just real, but lived. This is among the reasons why 'there is 
nothing simple about the dynamics of racism'.xxxvii 
 Applied to the problem of race in capitalism, Althusser's concepts of articulation, 
over-determination, and of societies structured-in-dominance, permitted Hall, by his own 
account, to undermine the teleological reductivism and economism of a certain Marxism – 
which would see race inevitably dissolved by class contradiction – as well as culturalist or 
ethnocentric accounts which treated race and racism as purely autonomous variables.xxxviii 
Both of these positions elide the historical specificity, which is also to say the political 
cognisability, of social formations in which race plays a structuring role. They helped Hall 
to think, especially in the collaborative project Policing the Crisis, how  
 
the structures through which black labour is reproduced … are not simply 'coloured' by race: 
they work through race. The relations of capitalism can be thought of as articulating classes in 
distinct ways at each of the levels of instances of the social formation – economic, political, 
ideological. These levels are the “effects” of the structures of modern capitalist production, with 
the necessary displacement of relative autonomy operating between them.xxxix  
 
We would like to propose that contemporary debates on race and property could also be 
thought according to this model, to detail the ways in which property law also works 
through race,xl and to investigate how, to use Hall's terms, the absence of any necessary 
correspondence between race and class, or race and property, by no means entails 
'necessarily no correspondence' between them.xli 
 At stake in thinking about legal forms as both articulated with and an articulation 
of economic and social relations, is continuing the excavation of how capitalist property 
relations preserve and rely upon 'other relations that are not ascribable within the “social 
relations of production”. These include distinctions at the level of culture and values' – 
maintained by institutional structures, particular forms of political power, and of course, 
histories of colonisation and slavery. For example, in commenting the work of sociologists 
such as John Rex writing in the 1970s about South Africa, Hall notes that specifically 
colonial modes of labour were foundational to the establishment of a capitalist market 
economy: 
 
The ‘origin’ of the capitalist mode in conditions of conquest, coupled with 
the ‘peculiar institutions’ of unfree labour thus preserve, at the economic 
level, and secure its continuing racially ascriptive features. This is a 
capitalism of a very specific and distinctive kind: “there are a number of 
different relationships to the means of production more subtle than can be 
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comprehended in terms of distinction between owners and non-owners’ 
each of which ‘gives rise to specific class situations… a whole range of class 
situations.’xlii  
 
Both before and after Hall's writing, the articulation of different strategies of accumulation, 
embedded in colonial modes of land appropriation, feudal social relations, and free and 
unfree labour, conceived of as constituting the mode through which legal forms of property 
and relations of ownership take root, has been undertaken by many scholars writing in the 
black radical tradition and indigenous studies. It is to them that we now turn.  
 
Race, dispossession and the subject of property 
At the turn of the 20th century, Peruvian socialist Jose Mariátegui wrote incisively of the 
dispossession of Indian communities in Peru as the ground upon which the latifundistas 
built an agrarian economy that largely failed, in his view, to escape feudal social relations. 
Nonetheless, this was a feudalism that contained within it an 'incipient capitalism'.xliii 
Mariátegui posited the ‘Indian land question’ as one that was inherently economic, while 
also identifying those social and cultural aspects of 'indigenous communism' that were so 
severely diminished by the gradual imposition of colonial capitalist land ownership. 
Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz has also identified the dispossession of indigenous lands as the 
central motor force of primitive accumulation in the United States.xliv  
 Dunbar-Ortiz maps the conquest of New Mexico through an exploration of three 
different but interlocking modes of ongoing capitalist expropriation: primitive 
accumulation based on the appropriation of native land, the appropriation of key 
resources, namely water, and the exploitation of native labour on the large estates, which 
was facilitated by successive imposition of non-native property law and land tenure and 
military occupation. Dunbar-Ortiz reveals how contrary to orthodox Marxist 
understandings of the development of capitalism, the 'expropriation of the land, the means 
of production, and the resources' of the indigenous population, including their labour, are 
each coterminous with the development of agrarian capitalism in the U.S., and continue 
into the present. We could also mention here the work of Silvia Federici,xlv Glen 
Coulthard,xlvi and Ruth Wilson Gilmore, as demonstrating how contemporary capitalist 
accumulation relies on an amalgam of older and newer inventive mechanisms that 
preserve racial and gendered logics established during colonial settlement and slavery. In 
her landmark book, The Golden Gulag, Ruth Wilson Gilmore explores the many different 
economies involved in the intensification of incarceration in California. She examines how 
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chronic unemployment and deindustrialisation, planning laws, the use of financial 
instruments by public authorities to generate revenue, and of course, a racial moral panic 
about crime, provided the fertile ground for prison expansion in California. Crucially, 
Wilson Gilmore illuminates the human cost of the forms of expropriation detailed in the 
book, emphasising that entire ways of life are unmoored by capital flight.xlvii  
 Employing the framework of articulation as a way of understanding contemporary 
forms of dispossession also offers one way of addressing the very salient question of legal 
subjectivity. As noted above, Hall endorses John Rex's observation whereby the distinction 
between owner and non-owner is no longer adequate, if it ever was, fully to understand 
racialised capitalist social formations, and we could say by extension, contemporary forms 
of property and relations of ownership. This is not only because legal forms of property 
have proliferated so intensely in late modernity, rendering the function of ownership 
somewhat ambiguous in relation to key functions traditionally ascribed by Marxist 
theorists to ownership, namely, exclusive control over the means of production. Hall 
seconds this observation because when we examine the specificities of how historically 
embedded forms of racism and patriarchy overlapped with particular economic structures, 
the attributes normally ascribed to the ‘owner’ are much more complex. For instance, the 
individual self-interest of black property owners and their involvement in race-based land 
expropriation in the 1960s and 1970s can only be explained, as N.D.B. Connolly does in his 
book A World More Concrete: Real Estate and the Remaking of Jim Crow South Florida, 
because of the long history of slavery and legalised racism that made property ownership 
the most prized path to full citizenship. In other words, merely seeing black property 
owners as driven by the same profit motive as white landlords, or employing an 
economically reductive analytical framework, truly fails to grasp what the meaning of 
ownership is for black landlords, given the social relations and histories of race and racism 
that have shaped the US real estate market.  
 Connolly argues that immigrants, black land- and property-owners, and even 
indigenous people 'made tremendous investments in racial apartheid, largely in an effort 
to govern growing cities and to unleash the value of land as real estate'.xlviii Exploitative 
landlord and tenant relations between black landlords and black tenants were triangulated 
through that 'white apex' we have already encountered in Hall, embodied concretely in the 
real property that signified full citizenship and political power. The ideology of ownership 
embraced by these particular groups of people and individual landowners was mediated 
through histories of dispossession and displacement. The concept of the self-possessive 
individual that is variously assumed and critiqued by Marxist scholars also requires a 
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deconstruction that takes into account the persistence of racism configured through 
relations of ownership. Scholars such as Saidiya Hartman have foregrounded C.B. 
Macpherson’s failure to account for the history of slavery and subsequent to that, Jim Crow 
laws that formed the conditions in which the ideal-typical possessive individual came into 
being. Hartmann has argued that freedom from slavery, which granted former slaves entry 
into the framework of possessive individualism as free subjects, entailed a cruel 
contradiction.  Self-possession was characterised, for instance, by the taking of a surname, 
often that of the ex-master, that 'conferred… the paradox of emancipation and the 
dispossession that acquires the status of a legacy'.xlix Moving from the status of an object to 
that of a labouring subject was marked by debt peonage and labour conditions so brutal 
that they could hardly be said to reflect the alienation of one’s labour through free choice.l 
As Hartman writes, '[t]he propertied person remained vulnerable to the dispossession 
exacted by violation, domination, and exploitation' that existed during slavery.li This is the 
recent history that informs present ideologies of ownership and the cultural and social 
significance of ownership for people of colour in the US, and particularly within black and 
indigenous communities.  
 The notion of ‘articulation’ also opens up the figure of the self-possessive individual 
to considering the colonially-inscribed concepts of race in the fashioning of the modern 
legal subject. Balibar’s Identity and Difference has begun to bridge the long-standing gap 
between Locke’s theory of consciousness in the Essay on Human Understanding and his 
theory of property elaborated in the Two Treatises of Government. How might Balibar’s 
reflections on Locke assist us in accounting for the place of race and patriarchy in the 
identity-property nexus, or the contact point between propriety and property? In drawing 
out and emphasising the temporal dimension of Locke’s concept of self-consciousness, the 
concept of the self in the Essay not only moves closer to the political philosophy of 
property in the Two Treatises of Government, but bears traits or qualities that mirror 
Lockean concepts of property and ownership. Balibar argues here that the connection 
between identity and property ownership is relational, encompassing both an interiority of 
the self and the exteriority of the world (and social relations) outside of it. This relational 
aspect of the self in Locke’s thought mirrors the relational nature of property itself, an 
ideational concept that travels between an ontological plane and the exterior world of 
relations of ownership. 
 In this expansive reading of Locke, Balibar outlines a theory of constituent property; 
an 'originary property' that is not 'measured' by pre-existing institutions because it is 
'individuality itself'. With constituent property, 'property as such is the exercise of liberty' 
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in the sense that 'every free man must always be considered somehow a proprietor, or an 
“owner” of something' which is individuality itself. Individuality, as noted above, is 
constituted through the self-recognition of one’s memory of past and present thoughts. 
The idea that every man has property in himself brings propriety back into contact with 
property; or, to put it another way, Balibar presents a theory of a relation between 
constituted property and constituent property. The proper subject is not only he who 
actually owns property, or is able to ‘freely’ alienate his labour, but is, fundamentally, he 
who has the capacity to engage in the conscious reflection that marks out or defines the 
internal stage, 'an indefinitely open field in which [self-consciousness] is both actor and 
spectator'.lii 
 Here we can attempt to identify the ways in which a racial anthropology of the 
human is smuggled into the ontological grounding of the possessive individual.  The 
primary place of interiority in the conceptualisation of this subject – one version of 
Spivak’s 'transparent “I”' – sets the scene for an analytic of raciality that emerges in the 19th 
century. By locating the sovereign source of the self in Reason, Ferreira da Silva finds 'the 
negation, the declaration of the onto-epistemological inexistence of, exterior things, that is, 
the affirmation that, as objects of knowledge, phenomena, they constitute but effects of the 
interior tools of “pure reason”.'liii Racial subjects – the black slave, the Native, the savage – 
are located in an exterior realm of Nature by scientific and philosophical discourses that 
give primacy to the subject of interiority. Ferreira da Silva intervenes in our understanding 
of how the relationship between interiority and exteriority – as a defining characteristic of 
the modern subject – is mapped onto the globe and world history, so as to render most 
inhabitants of the non-European world as mere effects of the powers of Reason, which lie 
in the sole custody of their European superiors. 
 Taking the self-possessive individual back to the somewhat more specific scene of 
American real estate, it becomes evident that this articulation of specific histories of race 
and modes of possession, or to be more specific, the social relations of race and class that 
are reflected in practices of redlining and the changes in lending practices can quite easily 
become disarticulated from the crisis caused by the financialisation of mortgage-backed 
securities, making the confluence of race and financialisation seem more coincidental than 
a structurally-integrated form of articulation, one critical to the reproduction of the US 
capitalist social order. For instance, in Gary Dymski’s article 'Racial Exclusion and the 
Political Economy of the Subprime Crisis', the author analyses how redlining practices led 
to the 'creation of a multi-racial community-based movement' that advocated for an 
increase in mortgage financing for low-income 'minority' households.liv This would allow 
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for wealth-accumulation through homeownership. Dymski poses the question, from a 
'capital-accumulation perspective… why would profit-seeking firms not set aside racial bias 
and make profitable loans' to minority households? He then states the following:  
 
Two responses suggest plausible explanations of this paradox. First, while 
lenders seek profits, most lending institutions and lending officers are 
non-minority, and thus susceptible to perceptual racial bias (despite their 
commitment to profit-maximisation). Second, the perceived risks 
associated with lending in minority-areas and to minorities are sufficiently 
great to deter lending.lv  
 
We want to suggest that these ‘plausible explanations’ actually disarticulate the racial 
foundations of property ownership in the US real estate market. Long histories of racial-
economic dispossession are side-lined, and instead, racial prejudice as a generalised, 
almost transhistorical phenomenon is offered as an explanation for race-based lending 
practices, alongside the 'rational discrimination' argument. Similarly, the explanation for 
why racial exclusion was then replaced in part by extortionary racial inclusion in the form 
of subprime loans is reduced down to a matter of economics. And while greed certainly 
does explain a lot, it does not adequately account for how these lending practices exploited 
the social and cultural significance of ownership for communities who had not only been 
denied the credit facility, but for whom full juridical subjectivity and political inclusion had 
been denied on the basis of a certain ideal figure of the possessive individual, and 
practically and historically speaking, had been defined in opposition to the black slave as 
object of ownership. In other words, how predatory lending targeted communities in which 
race is lived through property (along with class and gender), and vice versa. 
 This brings us to the greatest challenge for thinking race and class formations in 
relation to ownership through Marxian categories of analysis. Ownership, for black people 
in the US, for indigenous people throughout North America, and for working class 
immigrants, has always been refracted through the value of life itself, not reducible down 
to the category or reality of labour, be it free or unfree. If freedom was and remains bound 
to a debt that can never, it seems, be fully paid off, it seems that justice might require a 
disarticulation of the fetishes produced by racial and propertied abstractions, a de-
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